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Abstract
We use the martingale-theoretic approach of game-theoretic probability to incorporate imprecision
into the study of randomness. In particular, we define a notion of computable randomness asso-
ciated with interval, rather than precise, forecasting systems, and study its properties. The richer
mathematical structure that thus arises lets us better understand and place existing results for the
precise limit. When we focus on constant interval forecasts, we find that every infinite sequence of
zeroes and ones has an associated filter of intervals with respect to which it is computably random.
It may happen that none of these intervals is precise, which justifies the title of this paper. We
illustrate this by showing that computable randomness associated with non-stationary precise fore-
casting systems can be captured by a stationary interval forecast, which must then be less precise:
a gain in model simplicity is thus paid for by a loss in precision.
Keywords: computable randomness; imprecise probabilities; game-theoretic probability; interval
forecast; supermartingale; computability.
1. Introduction
This paper documents the first steps in our attempt to incorporate indecision and imprecision into
the study of randomness. Consider a infinite sequence ω = (z1, . . . ,zn, . . . ) of zeroes and ones; when
do we call it random? There are many notions of randomness, and many of them have a number
of equivalent definitions (Ambos-Spies and Kucera, 2000; Bienvenu et al., 2009). We focus here on
computable randomness, mainly because its focus on computability—rather than, say, the weaker
lower semicomputability—has allowed us in this first attempt to keep the mathematical nitpicking
at arm’s length. Randomness of a sequence ω is typically associated with a probability measure
on the sample space of all infinite sequences, or—what is equivalent—with a forecasting system
γ that associates with each finite sequence of outcomes (x1, . . . ,xn) the (conditional) expectation
γ(x1, . . . ,xn) for the next (as yet unknown) outcome Xn+1. The sequence ω is then called comput-
ably random when it passes a (countable) number of computable tests of randomness, where the
collection of randomness tests depends of the forecasting system γ . An alternative but equivalent
definition, going back to Ville (1939), sees each forecast γ(x1, . . . ,xn) as a fair price for—and there-
fore a commitment to bet on—the as yet unknown next outcome Xn+1. The sequence ω is then
computably random when there is no computable strategy for getting infinitely rich by exploiting
the bets made available by the forecasting system γ along the sequence, without borrowing. Tech-
nically speaking, all computable non-negative supermartingales should remain bounded on ω , and
the forecasting system γ determines what a supermartingale is.
It is this last, martingale-theoretic approach which seems to lend itself most easily to allowing
for imprecision in the forecasts, and therefore in the definition of randomness. As we explain in Sec-
tions 2 and 3, an ‘imprecise’ forecasting system γ associates with each finite sequence of outcomes
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(x1, . . . ,xn) a (conditional) expectation interval γ(x1, . . . ,xn) for the next (as yet unknown) outcome
Xn+1, whose lower bound represents a supremum acceptable buying price, and whose upper bound
a infimum acceptable selling price for Xn+1. This idea rests firmly on the common ground between
Walley’s (1991) theory of coherent lower previsions and Shafer and Vovk’s (2001) game-theoretic
approach to probability that we have established in recent years, through our research on impre-
cise stochastic processes (De Cooman and Hermans, 2008; De Cooman et al., 2016). This allows
us to associate supermartingales with an imprecise forecasting system, and therefore in Section 5
to extend the existing notion of computable randomness to allow for interval, rather than precise,
forecasts—we discuss computability in Section 4. We show in Section 6 that our approach allows
us to extend some of Dawid’s (1982) well-known work on calibration, as well as an interesting
‘limiting frequencies’ or computable stochasticity result.
We believe the discussion becomes really interesting in Section 7, where we look at stationary
interval forecasts to extend the classical account of randomness. That classical account typically
considers a forecasting system with stationary expectation forecast 1/2—corresponding to flipping
a fair coin. As we have by now come to expect from our experience with imprecise probability
models, a much more interesting mathematical picture appears when allowing for interval forecasts
than the rather simple case of precise forecasts would lead us to suspect. In the precise case, a given
sequence may not be (computably) random for any stationary forecast, but in the imprecise case
there is always a set filter of intervals that a given sequence is computably random for. Furthermore,
as we show in Section 8, this filter may not have a smallest element, and even when it does, this
smallest element may be a non-vanishing interval: randomness may be inherently imprecise.
2. A single interval forecast
The dynamics of making a single forecast can be made very clear by considering a simple game,
with three players, namely Forecaster, Sceptic and Reality.
Game: single forecast of an outcome X
In a first step, Forecaster specifies an interval bound I = [p, p] for the expectation of an as yet
unknown outcome X in {0,1}—or equivalently, for the probability that X = 1. We interpret this
interval forecast I as a commitment, on the part of Forecaster, to adopt p as a supremum buying
price and p as a infimum selling price for the gamble (with reward function) X. This is taken to mean
that the second player, Sceptic, can now in a second step take Forecaster up on any (combination)
of the following commitments:
(i) for any p ∈ [0,1] such that p≤ p, and any α ≥ 0 Forecaster must accept the gamble α [X− p],
leading to an uncertain reward −α [X− p] for Sceptic;1
(ii) for any q ∈ [0,1] such that q ≥ p, and any β ≥ 0 Forecaster accepts the gamble β [q−X],
leading to an uncertain reward −β [q−X] for Sceptic.
Finally, in a third step, the third player, Reality, determines the value x of X in {0,1}. 
Elements x of {0,1} are called outcomes, and elements p of the real unit interval [0,1] are
called (precise) forecasts. We denote by C the set of non-empty closed subintervals of the real unit
interval [0,1]. Any element I of C is called an interval forecast. It has a smallest element min I
1. Because we allow p ≤ p rather than p < p, we actually see p as a maximum buying price, rather than a supremum
one. We do this because it does not affect the conclusions, but simplifies the mathematics. Similarly for q≥ p.
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Figure 1: Gambles f available to Sceptic when (a) Forecaster announces I ∈ C with p < p; and
when (b) Forecaster announces I ∈ C with p = p =: r.
and a greatest element max I, so I = [min I,max I]. We will use the generic notation I for such an
interval, and p :=min I and p :=max I for its lower and upper bounds, respectively.
After Forecaster announces a forecast interval I, what Sceptic can do is essentially to try and
increase his capital by taking a gamble on the outcome X. Any such gamble can be considered as a
map f : {0,1}→R, and can therefore be represented as a vector ( f (1), f (0)) in the two-dimensional
vector space R2; see also Figure 1. f (X) is then the increase in Sceptic’s capital after the game has
been played, as a function of the outcome variable X. Of course, not every gamble f (X) on the
outcome X will be available to Sceptic: which gambles he can take is determined by Forecaster’s
interval forecast I. In their most general form, they are given by f (X) = −α [X− p]− β [q−X],
where α and β are non-negative real numbers, p≤ p and q≥ p. If we consider the so-called lower
expectation (functional) EI associated with an interval forecast I, defined by
EI( f ) =min
p∈I
Ep( f ) =min
p∈I
[
p f (1)+ (1− p) f (0)]={Ep( f ) if f (1)≥ f (0)
Ep( f ) if f (1)≤ f (0)
(1)
for any gamble f : {0,1} → R, and similarly, the upper expectation (functional) EI , defined by
E I( f ) =max
p∈I
Ep( f ) =
{
Ep( f ) if f (1) ≥ f (0)
Ep( f ) if f (1) ≤ f (0)
=−EI(− f ), (2)
then it is not difficult to see that the cone of gambles f (X) that are available to Sceptic after Fore-
caster announces an interval forecast I is completely determined by the condition EI( f ) ≤ 0, as
depicted by the blue regions in Figure 1. The functionals EI and EI are easily shown to have the
following properties, typical for the more general lower and upper expectation operators defined on
more general gamble spaces (Walley, 1991; Troffaes and De Cooman, 2014):
Proposition 1 Consider any forecast interval I ∈ C . Then for all gambles f ,g on {0,1}, µ ∈ R
and non-negative λ ∈ R:
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C1. min f ≤ EI( f )≤ EI( f )≤max f ; [bounds]
C2. EI(λ f ) = λEI( f ) and E I(λ f ) = λEI( f ); [non-negative homogeneity]
C3. EI( f +g)≥ EI( f )+EI(g) and EI( f +g)≤ EI( f )+EI(g); [super/subadditivity]
C4. EI( f +µ) = EI( f )+µ and EI( f +µ) = EI( f )+µ . [constant additivity]
3. Interval forecasting systems and imprecise probability trees
We now consider a sequence of repeated versions of the forecast game in the previous section, where
at each stage k ∈ N, Forecaster presents an interval forecast Ik = [pk, pk] for the unknown outcome
variable Xk. This effectively allows Sceptic to choose any gamble fk(Xk) such that EIk( f ) ≤ 0.
Reality then chooses a value xk for Xk, resulting in a gain, or increase in capital, fk(xk) for Sceptic.
We call (x1,x2, . . . ,xn, . . . ) an outcome sequence, and collect all possible outcome sequences in
the set Ω := {0,1}N. We collect the finite outcome sequences (x1, . . . ,xn) in the set Ω♦ := {0,1}∗ =⋃
n∈N0{0,1}n. Finite sequences s in Ω♦ and infinite sequences ω in Ω are the nodes—called situ-
ations—and paths in an event tree with unbounded horizon, part of which is depicted below.
0
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In this repeated game, Forecaster will only provide interval forecasts Ik after observing the actual
sequence (x1, . . . ,xk−1) that Reality has chosen. This is the essence of so-called prequential fore-
casting (Dawid, 1982, 1984; Dawid and Vovk, 1999). But for technical reasons, it will be useful to
consider the more involved setting where a forecast Is is specified in each of the possible situations
s ∈Ω♦; see the figure below.
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Indeed, we can use this idea to generalise the notion of a forecasting system (Vovk and Shen, 2010).
Definition 2 (Forecasting system) A forecasting system is a map γ : Ω♦→C , that associates with
any situation s in the event tree a forecast γ(s) ∈ C . With any forecasting system γ we can associate
two real-valued maps γ and γ on Ω♦, defined by γ(s) :=minγ(s) and γ(s) :=maxγ(s) for all s∈Ω♦.
A forecasting system γ is called precise if γ = γ . Γ denotes the set C Ω
♦
of all forecasting systems.
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Specifying such a forecasting system requires imagining in advance all moves that Reality could
make, and devising in advance what forecasts to give in each imaginable situation s. In the precise
case, that is typically what one does when specifying a probability measure on the so-called sample
space Ω—the set Ω of all paths.
Since in each situation s the interval forecast Is = γ(s) corresponds to a local lower expect-
ation EIs , we can use the argumentation in our earlier papers (De Cooman and Hermans, 2008;
De Cooman et al., 2016) on stochastic processes to let the forecasting system γ turn the event tree
into a so-called imprecise probability tree, with an associated global lower expectation, and a cor-
responding notion of ‘(strictly) almost surely’. In what follows, we briefly recall how to do this; for
more context, we also refer to the seminal work by Shafer and Vovk (2001).
For any path ω ∈ Ω, the initial sequence that consists of its first n elements is a situation in
{0,1}n that is denoted by ωn. Its n-th element belongs to {0,1} and is denoted by ωn. As a
convention, we let its 0-th element be the initial situation ω0 = ω0 =. We write that s⊑ t, and say
that the situation s precedes the situation t, when every path that goes through t also goes through
s—so s is a precursor of t.
A process F is a map defined on Ω♦. A real process is a real-valued process: it associates a real
number F(s) ∈ R with every situation s ∈ Ω♦. With any real process F , we can always associate a
process ∆F , called the process difference. For every situation (x1, . . . ,xn)with n∈N0, ∆F(x1, . . . ,xn)
is a gamble on {0,1} defined by ∆F(x1, . . . ,xn)(xn+1) := F(x1, . . . ,xn+1)− F(x1, . . . ,xn) for all
xn+1 ∈ {0,1}. In the imprecise probability tree associated with a given forecasting system γ , a
submartingale M for γ is a real process such that Eγ(x1,...,xn)(∆M(x1, . . . ,xn)) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N0
and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n. A real process M is a supermartingale for γ if −M is a submartingale,
meaning that Eγ(x1,...,xn)(∆M(x1, . . . ,xn)) ≤ 0 for all n ∈ N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n: all super-
martingale differences have non-positive upper expectation, so supermartingales are real processes
that Forecaster expects to decrease. We denote the set of all submartingales for a given forecasting
system γ by Mγ—whether a real process is a submartingale depends of course on the forecasts in
the situations. Similarly, the set M
γ
:=−Mγ is the set of all supermartingales for γ .
It is clear from the discussion in Section 2 that the supermartingales are effectively all the
possible capital processes K for a Sceptic who starts with an initial capital K (), and in each
possible subsequent situation s selects a gamble fs = ∆K (s) that is available there because Fore-
caster specifies the interval forecast Is = γ(s) and because EIs( fs) = Eγ(s)(∆K (s)) ≤ 0. If Reality
chooses outcomes s = (x1, . . . ,xn), then Sceptic ends up with capital K (x1, . . . ,xn) = K () +
∑n−1k=0 ∆K (x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1). A non-negative supermartingale M is non-negative in all situations,
which corresponds to Sceptic never borrowing any money. We call test supermartingale any non-
negative supermartingale M that starts with unit capital M() = 1. We collect all test supermartin-
gales for γ in the set T
γ
.
In the context of probability trees, we call variable any function defined on the sample space Ω.
When this variable is real-valued and bounded, we call it a gamble on Ω. An event A in this context
is a subset of Ω, and its indicator IA is a gamble on Ω assuming the value 1 on A and 0 elsewhere.
The following expressions define lower and upper expectations on such gambles g on Ω:
Eγ(g) :=sup
{
M() : M ∈Mγ and limsup
n→+∞
M(ωn)≤ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
}
(3)
E
γ
(g) := inf
{
M() : M ∈Mγ and liminf
n→+∞ M(ω
n)≥ g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
}
=−Eγ(g). (4)
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They satisfy coherence properties similar to those in Proposition 1. We refer to extensive discus-
sions elsewhere (De Cooman et al., 2016; Shafer and Vovk, 2001) about why these expressions are
interesting and useful. For our present purposes, it may suffice to mention that for precise fore-
casts, they lead to models that coincide with the ones found in measure-theoretic probability theory
(Shafer and Vovk, 2001, Chapter 8). In particular, when all Is = {1/2}, they coincide with the usual
uniform (Lebesgue) expectations on measurable gambles.
We call an event A ⊆ Ω null if Pγ(A) := Eγ(IA) = 0, or equivalently Pγ(Ac) := Eγ(IAc) = 1,
and strictly null if there is some test supermartingale T ∈ Tγ that converges to +∞ on A, meaning
that limn→+∞T (ωn) = +∞ for all ω ∈ A. Any strictly null event is null, but null events need not
be strictly null (Vovk and Shafer, 2014; De Cooman et al., 2016). Because it is easily checked that
P
γ
( /0) = Pγ( /0) = 0 , the complement Ac of a (strictly) null event A is never empty. As usual, any
property that holds, except perhaps on a (strictly) null event, is said to hold (strictly) almost surely.
4. Basic computability notions
We recall a few notions and results from computability theory that are relevant to the discussion.
For a much more extensive treatment, we refer for instance to the books by Pour-El and Richards
(1989) and Li and Vitányi (1993).
A computable function φ : N0 → N0 is a function that can be computed by a Turing machine.
All notions of computability that we will need, build on this basic notion. It is clear that it in this
definition, we can replace any of the N0 with any other countable set.
We start with the definition of a computable real number. We call a sequence of rational numbers
rn computable if there are three computable functions a,b,σ from N0 to N0 such that b(n) > 0 and
rn = (−1)σ(n) a(n)b(n) for all n ∈ N0, and we say that it converges effectively to a real number x if there
is some computable function e : N0 → N0 such that n ≥ e(N)⇒ |rn− x| ≤ 2−N for all n,N ∈ N0.
A real number is then called computable if there is a computable sequence of rational numbers that
converges effectively to it. Of course, every rational number is a computable real.
We also need a notion of computable real processes, or in other words, computable real-valued
maps F : Ω♦ → R defined on the set Ω♦ of all situations. Because there is an obvious comput-
able bijection between N0 and Ω
♦, whose inverse is also computable, we can in fact identify real
processes and real sequences, and simply import, mutatis mutandis, the definitions for computable
real sequences common in the literature (Li and Vitányi, 1993, Chapter 0). Indeed, we call a net of
rational numbers rs,n computable if there are three computable functions a,b,s from Ω♦×N0 to N0
such that b(s,n) > 0 and rs,n = (−1)σ(s,n) a(s,n)b(s,n) for all s ∈ Ω♦ and n ∈ N0. We call a real process
F : Ω♦ → R computable if there is a computable net of rational numbers rs,n and a computable
function e : Ω♦×N0→N0 such that n≥ e(s,N)⇒ |rs,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−N for all s∈Ω♦ and n,N ∈N0.
Obviously, it follows from this definition that in particular F(t) is a computable real number for any
t ∈ Ω♦: fix s= t and consider the sequence rt,n that converges to F(s) as n→+∞. Also, a constant
real process is computable if and only if its constant value is.
The following definitions are now obvious. A gamble f on {0,1} is called computable if both
its values f (0) and f (1) are computable real numbers. An interval forecast I = [p, p] ∈ C is called
computable if both its lower bound p and upper bound p are computable real numbers. A forecasting
system γ is called computable if the associated real processes γ and γ are.
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5. Random sequences in an imprecise probability tree
We will now associate a notion of randomness with a forecasting system γ—or in other words, with
an imprecise probability tree. In what follows, we will often consider computable test supermartin-
gales. These computable test supermartingales for a forecasting system are countable in number,
because the computable processes are (Li and Vitányi, 1993; Vovk and Shen, 2010).
Definition 3 (Computable randomness) Consider any forecasting system γ : Ω♦→C . We call an
outcome sequence ω computably random for γ if all computable test supermartingales T remain
bounded above on ω , meaning that there is some B ∈ R such that T (ωn) ≤ B for all n ∈ N, or
equivalently, that supn∈NT (ωn) < +∞. We then also say that the forecasting system γ makes ω
computably random. We denote by ΓC(ω) := {γ ∈ Γ : ω is computably random for γ} the set of all
forecasting systems for which the outcome sequence ω is computably random.
Computable randomness of an outcome sequence means that there is no computable strategy that
starts with capital 1 and avoids borrowing, and allows Sceptic to increase his capital without bounds
by exploiting the bets on these outcomes that are made available to him by Forecaster’s specific-
ation of the forecasting system γ . When the forecasting system γ is precise and computable,
our notion of computable randomness reduces to the classical notion of computable randomness
(Ambos-Spies and Kucera, 2000; Bienvenu et al., 2009).
The (computable) vacuous forecasting system γv assigns the vacuous forecast γv(s) := [0,1] to
all situations s ∈ Ω♦. The following proposition implies that no ΓC(ω) is empty.
Proposition 4 All paths are computably random for the vacuous forecasting system: γv ∈ ΓC(ω)
for all ω ∈Ω.
More conservative (or imprecise) forecasting systems have more computably random sequences.
Proposition 5 Let ω be computably random for a forecasting system γ . Then ω is also computably
random for any forecasting system γ∗ such that γ ⊆ γ∗, meaning that γ(s)⊆ γ∗(s) for all s ∈ Ω♦.
6. Consistency results
We first show that any Forecaster who specifies a forecasting system is consistent in the sense that
he believes himself to be well calibrated: in the imprecise probability tree generated by his own
forecasts, (strictly) almost all paths will be computably random, so he is sure that Sceptic will not
be able to become infinitely rich at his expense, by exploiting his—Forecaster’s—forecasts. This
also generalises the arguments and conclusions in a paper by Dawid (1982).
Theorem 6 Consider any forecasting system γ : Ω♦→ C . Then (strictly) almost all outcome se-
quences are computably random for γ in the imprecise probability tree that corresponds to γ .
This result is quite powerful, and it guarantees in particular that:
Corollary 7 For any sequence of interval forecasts (I1, . . . , In, . . . ) there is a forecasting system
given by γ(x1, . . . ,xn) := In+1 for all (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n and all n ∈ N0, and associated impre-
cise probability tree such that (strictly) almost all—and therefore definitely at least one—outcome
sequences are computably random for γ in the associated imprecise probability tree.
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The following weaker consistency result deals with limits (inferior and superior) of relative fre-
quencies, taken with respect to a so-called selection process S : Ω♦→ {0,1}. It is a counterpart in
our more general context of the notions of computable stochasticity or Church randomness in the
precise case with I = {1/2} (Ambos-Spies and Kucera, 2000).
Theorem 8 (Church randomness) Let γ : Ω♦→C be any computable forecasting system, let ω =
(x1, . . . ,xn, . . . ) ∈ Ω be any outcome sequence that is computably random for γ , and let f be any
computable gamble on {0,1}. If S : Ω♦ → {0,1} is any computable selection process such that
∑nk=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)→+∞, then also
liminf
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
[
f (xk+1)−Eγ(x1,...,xk)( f )
]
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
≥ 0.
7. Constant interval forecasts
We now introduce a significant simplification. For any interval I ∈C , we let γI be the corresponding
stationary forecasting system that assigns the same interval forecast I to all nodes: γ I(s) := I for all
s ∈ Ω♦. In this way, with any outcome sequence ω , we can associate the collection of all interval
forecasts for which the corresponding stationary forecasting system makes ω computably random:
CC(ω) := {I ∈ C : γ I ∈ ΓC(ω)}= {I ∈ C : γ I makes ω computably random}.
As an immediate consequence of Propositions 4 and 5, we find that this set of intervals is non-empty
and increasing.
Proposition 9 (Non-emptiness) For all ω ∈Ω, [0,1] ∈CC(ω), so any sequence of outcomes ω has
at least one stationary forecast that makes it computably random: CC(ω) 6= /0.
Proposition 10 (Increasingness) Consider any ω ∈ Ω and any I,J ∈ C . If I ∈ CC(ω) and I ⊆ J,
then also J ∈ CC(ω).
Theorem 8 implies the following property. However, quite remarkably, and seemingly in contrast
with Theorem 8, this result does not require any computability assumptions on the (stationary)
forecasts.
Corollary 11 (Church randomness) Consider any outcome sequence ω = (x1, . . . ,xn, . . . ) in Ω
and any stationary interval forecast I = [p, p] ∈CC(ω) that makes ω computably random. Then for
any computable selection process S : Ω♦→ {0,1} such that ∑nk=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)→+∞:
p ≤ liminf
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
≤ limsup
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
≤ p.
The following proposition can of course be straightforwardly extended to any finite number of
interval forecasts, and guarantees, together with Proposition 10, that CC(ω) is a set filter.
Proposition 12 For any ω ∈Ω and any two interval forecasts I and J: if I ∈ CC(ω) and J ∈ CC(ω)
then I∩ J 6= /0, and I∩ J ∈ CC(ω).
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This result also tells us that the collection CC(ω) of closed subsets of the compact set [0,1] has the
finite intersection property, and its intersection is therefore a non-empty closed interval:
⋂
CC(ω) =
[p
C
(ω), pC(ω)]. Propositions 10 and 12 guarantee that all intervals [pC(ω)− ε1, pC(ω)+ ε2] in C
with ε1,ε2 > 0 belong to CC(ω). But we will see in the next section that this does not generally
hold for ε1 = 0 and/or ε2 = 0. For this reason, we now define the following two subsets of [0,1]:
LC(ω) := {min I : I ∈ CC(ω)} andUC(ω) := {max I : I ∈ CC(ω)}.
Then Proposition 10 guarantees that LC(ω) is a decreasing set, and that UC(ω) is increasing. They
are therefore both subintervals of [0,1]. Obviously, p
C
(ω) = supLC(ω) and pC(ω)= infUC(ω). On
the one hand clearly LC(ω) = [0, pC(ω)) or LC(ω) = [0, pC(ω)], and on the other hand UC(ω) =
(pC(ω),1] or UC(ω) = [pC(ω),1]. Proposition 12 easily allows us to give the following simple
description of the set CC(ω) in terms of LC(ω) andUC(ω):
I ∈ CC(ω)⇔
(
min I ∈ LC(ω) and max I ∈UC(ω)
)
.
A trivial example is given by:
Proposition 13 If the sequence ω is computable with infinitely many zeroes and ones, thenCC(ω)=
{[0,1]}, and therefore LC(ω) = {0}, UC(ω) = {1}, pC(ω) = 0 and pC(ω) = 1.
At the other extreme, there are the sequences ω that are computably random for some precise
stationary forecasting system γ{p}, with p∈ [0,1]. They are amongst the random sequences that have
received most attention in the literature, thus far. For any such sequence, CC(ω) = {I ∈ C : p ∈ I},
LC(ω) = [0, p] andUC(ω) = [p,0], and therefore also pC(ω) = pC(ω) = p.
We show in the next section that, in between these extremes of total imprecision and maximal
precision, there lies a—to the best of our knowledge—previously uncharted realm of sequences,
with similar (and even in some sense ‘larger’) unpredictability than the ones traditionally called
‘computably random’, for which LC(ω) and UC(ω) need not always be closed, and more import-
antly, for which 0 < p
C
(ω) < pC(ω) < 1. This is what we mean when we claim that ‘computable
randomness is inherently imprecise’.
8. Randomness is inherently imprecise
Our work on imprecise Markov chains (De Cooman et al., 2016) has taught us that in some cases, we
can very efficiently compute tight bounds on expectations in non-stationary precise Markov chains,
by replacing them with their stationary imprecise versions. Similarly, in statistical modelling, when
learning from data sampled from a distribution with a varying (non-stationary) parameter, it seems
hard to estimate the exact time sequence of its values. But we may be more successful in learning
about its (stationary) interval range. This idea was also considered earlier by Fierens et al. (2009),
when they argued for a frequentist interpretation of imprecise probability models based on non-
stationarity.
In this section, we exploit this idea, by showing that randomness associated with non-stationary
precise forecasting systems can be captured by a stationary forecasting system, which must then be
less precise: we gain simplicity of representation, but pay for it by losing precision.
We begin with a simple example. Consider any p and q in [0,1] with p ≤ q, and any outcome
sequence ω = (x1, . . . ,xn, . . . ) that is computably random for the forecasting system γp,q that is
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defined by
γp,q(z1, . . . ,zn) :=
{
p if n is odd
q if n is even
for all (z1, . . . ,zn) ∈ Ω♦.
We know from Corollary 7 that there is at least one such outcome sequence. It turns out that the
stationary forecasting systems that make such ω computably random have a simple characterisation:
Proposition 14 Consider any ω that is computably random for the forecasting system γp,q. Then
for all I ∈ C , I ∈ CC(ω)⇔ [p,q] ⊆ I.
Its proof relies on a very simple argument involving Corollary 11. This result implies in particular
also that LC(ω) = [0, p],UC(ω) = [q,1], pC(ω) = p and pC(ω) = q.
Next, we turn to a more complicated example, where we look at sequences that are ‘nearly’
computably random for the stationary precise forecast 1/2, but not quite. This example was inspired
by the ideas involving Hellinger-like divergences in a beautiful paper by Vovk (2009).
Consider the following sequence {pn}n∈N of precise forecasts:
pn :=
1
2
+(−1)nδn, with δn := e−
1
n+1
√
e
1
n+1 −1 for all n ∈ N,
converging to 1/2. Observe that the sequence δn is decreasing towards its limit 0 and that δn ∈ (0,1/2)
and pn ∈ (0,1), for all n ∈ N. Now consider any outcome sequence ω = (x1, . . . ,xn, . . . ) that is
computably random for the precise forecasting system γ∼1/2 that is defined by
γ∼1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1) := pn for all n ∈ N and (z1, . . . ,zn−1) ∈ Ω♦.
We know from Corollary 7 that there is at least one such outcome sequence. It turns out that the
stationary forecasting systems that make such ω computably random have a simple characterisation:
Proposition 15 Consider any ω that is computably random for the forecasting system γ∼1/2. Then
for all I ∈ C , I ∈ CC(ω) if and only if min I < 1/2 and max I > 1/2.
This result implies in particular that LC(ω) = [0,1/2),UC(ω) = (1/2,1] and pC(ω) = pC(ω) =
1/2.
9. Conclusion
Even with the limited number of examples we have been able to examine in this paper, it becomes
apparent that incorporating imprecision in the study of randomness allows for much more math-
ematical structure to arise, which we would argue lets us better understand and place the existing
results in the precise limit.
In our argumentation that ‘randomness is inherently imprecise’, we are well aware that we are
restricting ourselves to stationary forecasts. Our examples in Section 8 all involve sequences that
are computably random for a precise non-stationary forecasting system, but no longer computably
random for any stationary precise variant. To make our claim irrefutable, we would have to show
that there are sequences that are computably random for forecasting systems more precise than the
vacuous one, but not for any (computable) precise forecasting system. Or in other words, that there
is ‘randomness’ or ‘unpredictability’ that cannot be ‘explained’ by any non-stationary (computable)
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precise forecasting system. We will keep this challenge foremost in our minds. Nevertheless, the
examples in Section 8 do indicate that it is in some ways possible to replace an ‘explanation’ by a
complex non-stationary precise forecasting model by a(n infinite filter of) more imprecise stationary
one(s).
This work may seem promising, but we are well aware that it is only a humble beginning. We
see many extensions in many directions. First of all, we want to find out if our approach can also
be used to find interval versions ofMartin-Löf and Schnorr randomness (Ambos-Spies and Kucera,
2000; Bienvenu et al., 2009) with similarly interesting properties and conclusions. Secondly, our
preliminary exploration suggests that it will be possible to formulate equivalent randomness defin-
itions in terms of randomness tests, rather than supermartingales, but this needs to be checked in
much more detail. Thirdly, the approach we follow here is not prequential: we assume that our
Forecaster specifies an entire forecasting system γ , or in other words an interval forecast in all pos-
sible situations (x1, . . . ,xn), rather than only interval forecasts in those situations z1, . . . ,zn of the
sequence ω = (z1, . . . ,zn, . . . ) whose potential randomness we are considering. The prequential ap-
proach, which we eventually will want to come to, looks at the randomness of a sequence of interval
forecasts and outcomes (I1,z1, I2,z2, . . . , In,zn, . . . ), where each Ik is an interval forecast for the as
yet unknown Xk, which is afterwards revealed to be zk, without the need of specifying forecasts in
situations that are never reached; see the paper by Vovk and Shen (2010) for an account of how this
works for precise forecasts. Fourthly, we need to connect our work with earlier approaches to as-
sociating imprecision with randomness (Walley and Fine, 1982; Fierens et al., 2009; Fierens, 2009;
Gorban, 2016). And finally, and perhaps most importantly, we believe this research could be a very
early starting point for an approach to statistics that takes imprecise or set-valued parameters more
seriously, when learning from finite amounts of data.
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Appendix A. Proofs and additional material
In this Appendix, we have gathered all proofs, and all additional material necessary for understand-
ing the argumentation in these proofs.
A.1 Additional material for Section 3
In the interest of understanding the proofs, we need to pay attention to a particular way of con-
structing test supermartingales. We define a multiplier process as a map D from Ω♦ to non-negative
gambles on {0,1} Given such a multiplier process D, we can construct a non-negative real pro-
cess D⊚ by the recursion equation D⊚(sx) := D⊚(s)D(s)(x) for all s ∈ Ω♦ and x ∈ {0,1}, with
D⊚() := 1. Any multiplier process D that satisfies the additional condition that Eγ(s)(D(s)) ≤ 1
for all s ∈ Ω♦, is called a supermartingale multiplier for the forecasting system γ . It is easy to see
that the non-negative real process D⊚ is then a test supermartingale for γ : it suffices to check that
∆D⊚(s) = D⊚(s)[D(s)−1], (5)
and therefore Eγ(s)(∆D
⊚(s)) = D⊚(s)[Eγ(s)(D(s))− 1] ≤ 0, due to the coherence properties C2
and C4 of upper expectation operators.
A.2 Additional material for Section 4
We give a brief survey of those basic notions and results from computability theory that are relevant
to the proofs in this appendix. For a much more extensive discussion, we refer, for instance to the
books by Pour-El and Richards (1989) and Li and Vitányi (1993). The discussion in Section 4 is at
times similar—and even identical—but is overall more limited in scope, as it only deals with aspects
that are relevant to the main text.
A computable function φ : N0 → N0 is a function that can be computed by a Turing machine.
All further notions of computability that we will need are based on this basic notion. It is clear that
it in this definition, we can replace any of the N0 with any other countable set.
We start with the definition of a computable real number. We call a sequence of rational numbers
rn computable if there are three computable functions a,b,σ from N0 to N0 such that
b(n) > 0 and rn = (−1)σ(n) a(n)b(n) for all n ∈ N0,
and we say that it converges effectively to a real number x if there is some computable function
e : N0 → N0 such that
n≥ e(N)⇒ |rn− x| ≤ 2−N for all n,N ∈ N0.
A real number is then called computable if there is a computable sequence of rational numbers that
converges effectively to it. Of course, every rational number is a computable real.
We also need a notion of computable real processes, or in other words, computable real-valued
maps F : Ω♦ → R defined on the set Ω♦ of all situations. Because there is an obvious comput-
able bijection between N0 and Ω
♦, whose inverse is also computable, we can in fact identify real
processes and real sequences, and simply import, mutatis mutandis, the definitions for computable
real sequences common in the literature (Li and Vitányi, 1993, Chapter 0). Indeed, we call a net of
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rational numbers rs,n computable if there are three computable functions a,b,s from Ω♦×N0 to N0
such that
b(s,n) > 0 and rs,n = (−1)σ(s,n) a(s,n)b(s,n) for all s ∈ Ω
♦ and n ∈N0.
We call a real process F : Ω♦→ R computable if there is a computable net of rational numbers rs,n
and a computable function e : Ω♦×N0→ N0 such that
n≥ e(s,N)⇒ |rs,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈Ω♦ and n,N ∈ N0.
Again, there is no problem with the notions ‘computable net of rational numbers’ or ‘computable
function’ in this definition, because we can identify Ω♦×N0 withN0 through a computable bijection
whose inverse is also computable. Obviously, it follows from this definition that in particular F(t)
is a computable real number for any t ∈ Ω♦: fix s= t and consider the sequence rt,n that converges
to F(s) as n→+∞. Also, a constant real process is computable if and only if its constant value is.
We recall the following standard results (Li and Vitányi, 1993, Chapter 0).
Proposition 16 A real process F is computable if and only if there is a computable net of rational
numbers rs,n such that |rs,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−n for all s ∈ Ω♦ and n ∈ N0.
Proof of Proposition 16 We give the proof for the sake of completeness. The ‘if’ part is immedi-
ate, so we proceed to the ‘only if’ part. That F is computable means that there is some computable
net of rational numbers r′s,n and a computable function e : Ω♦×N0 → N0 such that n ≥ e(s,N) im-
plies |r′s,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈ Ω♦ and N ∈ N0. The net of rational numbers rs,n := r′s,e(s,n) is
computable because the function e is computable, and satisfies |rs,n−F(s)|= |r′s,e(s,n)−F(s)| ≤ 2−n.
Proposition 17 Consider any computable net xs,n of real numbers and any real process F for which
there is some computable function e : Ω♦×N0→ N0 such that
n≥ e(s,N)⇒ |xs,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈Ω♦ and N ∈N0.
Then F is computable.
Also, if F andG are computable real processes, then so are F+G, FG, F/G (provided that G(s) 6= 0
for all s ∈ Ω♦), max{F,G}, min{F,G}, exp(F), lnF (provided that F(s) > 0 for all s ∈ Ω♦), and
F
1
m (provided that F(s)≥ 0 for all s ∈ Ω♦) for all m ∈ N (Li and Vitányi, 1993, Chapter 0).
We also require the notion of a semicomputable real processes. A real process F is lower
semicomputable if it can be approximated from below by a computable net of rational numbers,
meaning that there is a computable net of rational numbers rs,n such that
(i) rs,n+1 ≥ rs,n for all s ∈Ω♦ and n ∈ N0;
(ii) F(s) = limn→+∞ rs,n for all s ∈ Ω♦.
F is upper semicomputable if −F is lower semicomputable. The following result is standard, but
its proof is illustrative.
Proposition 18 A process F is computable if and only is it is both lower and upper semicomputable.
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Proof of Proposition 18 We begin with the ‘if’ part. Assume that F is both lower and upper
semicomputable. This implies that there are two computable nets of rational numbers rs,n and rs,n
such that rt,n ↑ F(t) and rt,n ↓ F(t) for any fixed t ∈ Ω♦. Consider the computable nets of rational
numbers defined by δs,n := rs,n − rs,n ≥ 0 and rs,n := (rs,n + rs,n)/2. For any fixed t ∈ Ω♦, the
sequence δt,n ↓ 0, which implies that for any N ∈ N0 there is a natural number e(t,N) such that
δt,n ≤ 2−N for all n ≥ e(t,N). It is obvious that the function e : Ω♦×N0 → N0 is computable, and
that n ≥ e(s,N) also implies |F(s)− rs,n| ≤ |rs,n− rs,n| = δs,n ≤ 2−N , for all s ∈ Ω♦ and n,N ∈ N0.
Hence, F is also computable.
We continue with the ‘only if’ part. Assume that F is computable, so there is a computable net
of rational numbers rs,n and a computable function e : Ω♦×N0 → N0 such that n≥ e(s,N) implies
|rs,n−F(s)| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈ Ω♦ and n,N ∈ N0. We prove that F is lower semicomputable; the
proof that F is upper semicomputable is completely similar. Consider the computable net of rational
numbers r′s,n := rs,e(s,n+1)− 2−(n+1), then clearly r′s,n ≤ F(s) and |r′s,n−F(s)| < 2−n for all s ∈ Ω♦
and n ∈ N0. This implies that we can always assume without loss of generality from the outset
that rs,n ≤ F(s) and e(s,N) = N [a similar idea was used in the proof of Proposition 16]. We now
construct a new computable net of rational numbers rs,n from our original net: for any fixed s ∈Ω♦,
start with rs,0 := rs,0 and e(s,0) = 0; let e(s,1) be the first k > e(s,0) such that rs,k ≥ rs,0, and let
rs,1 := rs,e(s,1); let e(s,2) be the first k > e(s,1) such that rs,k ≥ rs,1, and let rs,2 := rs,e(s,2); and so
on. The function e : Ω♦×N0→N0 is clearly computable, and therefore the net of rational numbers
rs,n is computable. Moreover, for any fixed t ∈ Ω♦ the subsequence rt,n of the sequence rt,n is non-
decreasing by construction, and it converges to F(t) because the original sequence rt,n does.
The following definitions and results are obvious and immediate. A gamble f on {0,1} is called
computable if and only if both its values f (0) and f (1) are computable real numbers. An interval
forecast I = [p, p] ∈ C is called computable if and only if both its lower bound p and upper bound
p are computable real numbers. A forecasting system γ is called computable if the associated real
processes γ and γ are. Finally, a process difference ∆F is called (lower/upper semi)computable if
the real processes ∆(s)(0) and ∆(s)(1), s ∈Ω♦ are; and similarly for a multiplier process D.
Proposition 19 For any computable gamble f on {0,1} and any computable forecasting system γ ,
the real processes Eγ(s)( f ) and Eγ(s)( f ), s ∈ Ω♦ are computable.
Proof of Proposition 19 Observe that both the real process minγ(s) f (1) + [1−minγ(s)] f (0),
s ∈ Ω♦ and the real process maxγ(s) f (1) + [1−maxγ(s)] f (0), s ∈ Ω♦ are computable. So are,
therefore, their maximum process Eγ(s)( f ), s ∈ Ω♦ and their minimum process Eγ(s)( f ), s ∈ Ω♦.
Proposition 20 For any I ∈ C , the stationary forecasting system γI is computable if and only if the
interval I is computable.
Proof of Proposition 20 Let p := min I and p := max I. Obviously, the constant real processes
γ
I
(s) := p and γ I(s) := p are computable if and only if their constant values p and p are.
Proposition 21 For any computable gamble f on {0,1} and any computable interval forecast I =
[p, p] ∈ C , the lower and upper expectations EI( f ) and EI( f ) are computable real numbers.
Proof of Proposition 21 This is an immediate consequence of Propositions 19 and 20. Or,
alternatively, observe that both real numbers p f (1) + (1− p) f (0) and p f (1) + (1− p) f (0) are
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computable. So are, therefore, their maximum EI( f ) and minimum EI( f ).
We will also need to use the following basic results.
Proposition 22 Consider any real process F, and its process difference ∆F. Then the following
statements hold:
(i) if F() and ∆F are lower semicomputable then so is F;
(ii) if F() and ∆F are upper semicomputable then so is F;
(iii) F is computable if and only if F() and ∆F are.
Proof of Proposition 22 We only prove the third statement. The proof for the first and second
statements are similar to the proof of the ‘if’ part of the third, but simpler.
There are a number of ways to prove the third statement, but we will use Proposition 16.
For the ‘if’ part, we assume that F() and ∆F are computable. This implies that there are a
computable sequence of rational numbers r,n and two computable nets of rational numbers rxs,n
such that |F()− r,n| ≤ 2−n and |∆F(s)(x)− rxs,n| ≤ 2−n for all s ∈Ω♦, n ∈N0 and x ∈ {0,1}. We
now define the computable net of rational numbers rs,n as follows: for any s = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Ω♦,
where m ∈N0, and any n ∈ N0, let
rs,n := r,n+
m
∑
k=1
rxk(x1,...,xk−1),n.
Then, since also
F(s) = F()+
m
∑
k=1
∆F(x1, . . . ,xk−1)(xk),
we see that
|F(s)− rs,n| ≤ |F()− r,n|+
m
∑
k=1
∣∣∆F(x1, . . . ,xk−1)(xk)− rxk(x1,...,xk−1),n∣∣≤ (m+1)2−n,
so if we define the (clearly) computable function e by
e(s,N) := N+m≥ N+ log2(m+1),
then n≥ e(s,N) implies that |F(s)− rs,n| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈Ω♦ and n ∈N0. Hence, F is computable.
For the ‘only if’ part, assume that F is computable. Then definitely in particular also its value
F() in the initial situation , so it only remains to prove that the process difference ∆F is com-
putable. Consider, to this effect, any x ∈ {0,1}. It follows from the computability of F that there is
a computable net of rational numbers r′s,n such that |F(s)− r′s,n| ≤ 2−n and |F(sx)− r′sx,n| ≤ 2−n and
therefore also
r′sx,n− r′s,n−2−(n−1) ≤ F(sx)−F(s)≤ r′sx,n− r′s,n+2−(n−1) for all s ∈ Ω♦ and n ∈ N0.
If we now let rxs,n := r
′
sx,n+1− r′s,n+1, then this defines a computable net of rational numbers rxs,n that
satisfies |∆F(s)(x)− rxs,n | ≤ 2−n for all s ∈Ω♦ and all n ∈N0. This means that ∆F is computable.
Proposition 23 Consider any computable real processes G, G′ and H. Consider the real process
F with computable F(), such that ∆F(s) = I{1}G(s)+ I{0}G′(s)+H(s) or ∆F(s) = G(s)∆H(s).
Then F is computable as well.
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Proof of Proposition 23 This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 22, since the condi-
tions imply that ∆F is computable.
Proposition 24 Consider any multiplier process D, and the associated real process D⊚. Then the
following implications hold:
(i) if D is lower semicomputable, then so are ∆D⊚ and D⊚;
(ii) if D is upper semicomputable, then so are ∆D⊚ and D⊚;
(iii) if D is computable, then so are ∆D⊚ and D⊚.
Proof of Proposition 24 We only give the proof for the first statement. The proof for the second
statement is completely similar, and the third statement then follows readily from the first and the
second.
Assume that D is lower semicomputable. This implies that there are two computable nets of
rational numbers rxs,n such that r
x
s,n ↑ D(s)(x), for x ∈ {0,1}. Since D(s)(x) ≥ 0, we may assume
without loss of generality that rxs,n≥ 0 too. We now construct the computable net of rational numbers
rs,n as follows: for any s= (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Ω♦, where m ∈ N0, and any n ∈ N0, let
rs,n :=
m−1
∏
k=0
rxk+1(x1,...,xk),n ≥ 0.
Then, since also
D⊚(s) =
m−1
∏
k=0
D(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1),
we see that rs,n ↑ D⊚(s) for all s ∈ Ω♦, so D⊚ is indeed lower semicomputable. Next, we construct
two computable nets of rational numbers txs,n as follows: for any s ∈Ω♦ and x ∈ {0,1}, let
txs,n := rs,n[r
x
s,n−1].
Then, since also, by Equation (5),
∆D⊚(s)(x) = D⊚(s)[D(s)(x)−1]
and rs,n ≥ 0, we see that txs,n ↑ ∆D⊚(s)(x) for all s ∈ Ω♦ and x ∈ {0,1}, so ∆D⊚ is indeed lower
semicomputable.
Proposition 25 Consider a multiplier process D and the associated real process D⊚. If D⊚ is
positive and computable, then so is D.
Proof of Proposition 25 Since D⊚ is positive, it follows trivially that D is positive as well.
Consider now any x ∈ {0,1}. Since D⊚ is computable, it follows from Proposition 22 that ∆D⊚
is computable, and therefore, we know that ∆D⊚(s)(x) is computable as well. Hence, since D⊚ is
computable and positive, we find that
D(s) =
D⊚(s)+∆D⊚(s)(x)
D⊚(s)
is computable.
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A.3 Proofs and additional material for Section 5
We denote by T
γ
C the countable set of all computable test supermartingales for the forecasting sys-
tem γ .
Proof of Proposition 4 In the imprecise probability tree associated with the vacuous forecasting
system γv, a real process is a supermartingale if and only if it is non-increasing. All test super-
martingales are therefore bounded above by 1 on any path ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Proposition 5 Since γ ⊆ γ∗ implies that Tγ
∗
C ⊆ T
γ
C, this follows trivially from Defini-
tion 3.
Proposition 26 Consider any forecasting system γ . Then for any outcome sequence ω , the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some computable non-negative supermartingale T ;
(ii) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some computable test supermartingale T ;
(iii) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some test supermartingale T , with ∆T computable;
(iv) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some test supermartingale T = D⊚, with D computable.
Proof of Proposition 26 Proposition 24 implies that (iv)⇒(iii) and, since T ()= 1 is rational and
therefore computable, Proposition 22 implies that (iii)⇒(ii). Hence, since (ii)⇒(i) holds trivially, it
suffices to prove that (i)⇒(iv).
So consider any computable non-negative supermartingale T such that supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞.
We will prove that there is a computable supermartingale multiplier D such that supn∈ND⊚(ωn) =
+∞. Let T ′ := 1/α(1+ T ), with α := 1+ T (). Then α is clearly computable, and therefore,
T ′ is computable as well. Also, since T is non-negative, we find that T ′ ≥ 1/α > 0 and T ′() =
1. Furthermore, since T is a supermartingale, T ′ is clearly a supermartingale as well. Finally,
since supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞, we have that supn∈NT ′(ωn) = +∞ as well. Hence, we find that T ′ is a
computable test supermartingale such that T ′ > 0 and supn∈NT ′(ωn) = +∞. Hence, without loss
of generality, we may assume that T is a positive test supermartingale. Since T is a positive test
supermartingale, there is a unique supermartingale multiplier D such that T = D⊚. Since T is
positive and computable, the computability of D follows from Proposition 25.
Proposition 27 Consider a computable precise forecasting system γ . Then for any outcome se-
quence ω , the following statements are equivalent:
(i) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some computable non-negative martingale T ;
(ii) supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞ for some computable non-negative supermartingale T .
Proof of Proposition 27 Since (i)⇒(ii) holds trivially, it suffices to prove that (ii)⇒(i). So
consider any computable non-negative supermartingale T ′ such that supn∈NT ′(ωn) = +∞. We will
prove that there is a computable non-negative martingale T such that supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞.
Since T ′ is a computable non-negative supermartingale such that supn∈NT ′(ωn) = +∞, it fol-
lows from Proposition 26 that there is a test supermartingale T ′′, with ∆T ′′ computable, such that
supn∈NT ′′(ωn) =+∞. Now let T be the unique real process such that T () = 1 and, for all s∈Ω♦:
∆T (s)(x) :=∆T ′′(s)(x)−Eγ(s)
(
∆T ′′(s)
)
=∆T ′′(s)(x)− γ(s)∆T ′′(s)(1)− (1− γ(s))∆T ′′(s)(0) for all x ∈ {0,1}.
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Since ∆T ′′ and γ are computable, ∆T is clearly computable as well. Therefore, and because
T () is rational and therefore also computable, it follows from Proposition 22 that T is comput-
able. Furthermore, for any situation s ∈ Ω♦, we have that ∆T (s) ≥ ∆T ′′(s) because by assumption
Eγ(s)(∆T
′′(s))≤ 0, and
Eγ(s)
(
∆T (s)
)
= Eγ(s)
(
∆T ′′(s)−Eγ(s)
(
∆T ′′(s)
))
= Eγ(s)
(
∆T ′′(s)
)−Eγ(s)(∆T ′′(s)) = 0.
Hence, it follows that T is a martingale and that ∆T ≥ ∆T ′′. Since T () = T ′′() = 1, the latter
implies that T ≥ T ′′. Since T ′′ is non-negative and supn∈NT ′′(ωn) = +∞, this in turn implies that
T is non-negative and that supn∈NT (ωn) = +∞. Since we already know that T is a computable
martingale, this establishes the desired result.
A.4 Proofs and additional material for Section 6
Proof of Theorem 6 Consider the event A := {ω ∈Ω : ω is computably random for γ}. We have
to show that there is a test supermartingale that converges to +∞ on Ac.
For every ω in Ac, there is some computable test supermartingale Tω that becomes unbounded
on ω . Since the Tω , ω ∈ Ac are countable in number, we can consider some countable convex
combination T of all of them, with non-zero coefficients. This is again a test supermartingale, that
becomes unbounded on all ω in Ac.
We now construct yet another test supermartingale T ′ that converges to+∞ on all ω where T be-
comes unbounded. The argument has by now become standard (Shafer and Vovk, 2001, Lemma 3.1).
For any n ∈ N, the real process T (n) defined by
T (n)(s) :=
{
2n if T (t)≥ 2n for some precursor t ⊑ s of s
T (s) otherwise
for all s ∈ Ω♦,
is again a test supermartingale. So is therefore the countable convex combination T ′ :=∑n∈N 2−nT (n).
It is clear that T ′ converges to +∞ on all paths ω where T becomes unbounded.
Proof of Corollary 7 Consider the forecasting system γ defined by
γ(x1, . . . ,xn) := In+1 for all (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n and all n ∈ N0.
Then it follows from Theorem 6 that in the imprecise probability tree associated with γ , (strictly)
almost all ω are computably random for this γ .
In order to state our next set of results, we require some additional notions. Consider a real
process F : Ω♦→R and a selection process S : Ω♦→{0,1}, and use them to define the real process
JFKS : Ω
♦→ R as follows:
JFKS(x1, . . . ,xn)
:=

0 if ∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk) = 0
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)[F(x1, . . . ,xk,xk+1)−F(x1, . . . ,xk)]
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
if ∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)> 0,
for all n ∈ N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Ω♦.
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In particular, fix any gamble f on {0,1}, and let, for all n ∈N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈Ω♦:
Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn) :=
n
∑
k=1
[
f (xk)−Eγ(x1,...,xk−1)( f )
]
then on the one hand
∆Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn)(xn+1) :=M
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn+1)−Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn) = f (xn+1)−Eγ(x1,...,xn)( f ), (6)
so ∆Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn) = f −Eγ(x1,...,xn)( f ), and therefore, on the other hand
Eγ(x1,...,xn)(∆M
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn)) = Eγ(x1,...,xn)( f )−Eγ(x1,...,xn)( f ) = 0. (7)
We conclude that the real processMγf is a submartingale, whose differences ∆M
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn) are uni-
formly bounded, for instance by ‖ f‖v := max f −min f . Observe by the way that in this particular
case:
JMγf KS(x1, . . . ,xn)
:=

0 if ∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk) = 0
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
[
f (xk+1)−Eγ(x1,...,xk)( f )
]
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
if ∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)> 0.
(8)
Proposition 28 If the gamble f on {0,1} and the forecasting system γ are computable, then so is
the submartingale Mγf .
Proof of Proposition 28 We use Proposition 23: Mγf () = 0 is obviously a computable real num-
ber; let G be the computable constant real process f (1), G′ the computable constant real process
f (0), and H the real process defined by H(s) = −Eγ(s)( f ) for all s ∈ Ω♦, computable by Proposi-
tion 21.
We can now apply our law of large numbers for submartingale differences (De Cooman et al., 2016,
Theorem 7) to get to the following result, which generalises Philip Dawid’s well-known consistency
result for Bayesian Forecasters (Dawid, 1982, Theorem 1), to deal with imprecise assessments:
Theorem 29 (The well-calibrated imprecise Bayesian) Let γ : Ω♦ → C be any forecasting sys-
tem, let S : Ω♦→{0,1} be any selection process, and let f be any gamble on {0,1}. Then
n
∑
k=0
S(X1, . . . ,Xk)→+∞⇒ liminf
n→+∞ JM
γ
f KS(X1, . . . ,Xn)≥ 0
(strictly) almost surely, in the imprecise probability tree associated with the forecasting system γ .
We repeat the proof here, borrowed from one of our earlier papers (De Cooman et al., 2016, The-
orem 7) and suitably adapted to include results on computability, because it will next help us prove
a related result—Theorem 8—that will turn out to be crucial in establishing the main claim of this
paper. One important step in this proof is, stripped to its bare essentials, based on a surprisingly
elegant and effective idea that goes back to Shafer and Vovk (2001, Lemma 3.3).
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Proof of Theorem 29 Consider the events D := {ω ∈ Ω : limn→+∞ ∑n−1k=0 S(ωk) = +∞} and the
event A := {ω ∈ Ω : liminfn→+∞JMγf KS(ωn) < 0}. We have to show that there is some test super-
martingale T that converges to+∞ on the set D∩A. Let B :=max{1,‖ f‖v}> 0, then we infer from
Equation (7) that B is a uniform real bound on ∆Mγf , meaning that |∆Mγf (s)| ≤ B for all situations
s ∈Ω♦.
For any r ∈N, let Ar :=
{
ω ∈Ω : liminfn→+∞JMγf KS(ωn)<− 12r
}
, then A=
⋃
r∈NAr. So fix any
r ∈N and consider any ω ∈ D∩Ar, then we have in particular that
liminf
n→+∞ JM
γ
f KS(ω
n)<− 1
2r
,
and therefore
(∀m ∈ N)(∃nm ≥ m)JMγf KS(ωnm)<−
1
2r
=−ε ,
with 0 < ε := 1
2r
< B. Consider now the test supermartingale FM of Lemma 30, with in particular
M :=Mγf and ξ = ξr :=
ε
2B2 =
1
2r+1B2 =
1
2r+1B
1
B <
1
B . We denote it by F
(r). It follows from Lemma 30
that
F(r)(ωnm)≥ exp
(
ε2
4B2
nm−1
∑
k=0
S(ωk)
)
= exp
(
1
22r+2B2
nm−1
∑
k=0
S(ωk)
)
for all m ∈ N. (9)
Consider any real R> 0 and m ∈N. Since also ω ∈D, we know that limn→+∞ ∑n−1k=0 S(ωk) =+∞, so
there is some natural number m′ ≥m such that exp( 1
22r+2B2 ∑
m′−1
k=0 S(ω
k)
)
> R. Hence it follows from
the statement in (9) that there is some nm′ ≥ m′ ≥ m—whence ∑nm′−1k=0 S(ωk) ≥ ∑m
′−1
k=0 S(ω
k)—such
that
F(r)(ωnm′ )≥ exp
(
1
22r+2B2∑
nm′−1
k=0 S(ω
k)
)
≥ exp
(
1
22r+2B2∑m
′−1
k=0 S(ω
k)
)
> R,
which implies that limsupn→+∞F(r)(ωn) = +∞. Observe that for this test supermartingale,
F(r)(x1, . . . ,xn)≤ (3
2
)n for all n ∈ N0 and x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}n.
Now define the process T γf := ∑r∈Nw
(r)F (r) as any countable convex combination of the F(r)
constructed above, with positive weights w(r) > 0 that sum to one. This is a real process, because
each term in the series for T γf (x1, . . . ,xn) is non-negative, and moreover
T γf (x1, . . . ,xn)≤ ∑
r∈N
w(r)F(r) ≤ ∑
r∈N
w(r)
(3
2
)n
=
(3
2
)n
for all n ∈ N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n. (10)
This process is also positive, has T γf () = 1, and, for any ω ∈D∩A, it follows from the argument-
ation above that there is some r ∈ N such that ω ∈D∩Ar and therefore
limsup
n→+∞
T γf (ω
n)≥ w(r) limsup
n→+∞
F(r)(ωn) = +∞, (11)
so limsupn→+∞T
γ
f (ω
n) = +∞.
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We now prove that T γf is a supermartingale, and therefore also a test supermartingale. Consider
any n∈N0 and any (x1, . . . ,xn)∈ {0,1}n, then we have to prove that Eγ(x1,...,xn)(−∆T
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn))≥
0. Since it follows from the argumentation in the proof of Lemma 30 that
−∆F(r)(x1, . . . ,xn) = 1
2r+1B2
F(r)(x1, . . . ,xn)∆M
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn) for all r ∈ N,
we see that
−∆T γf (x1, . . . ,xn) =−∑
r∈N
w(r)∆F(r) = ∆Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn) ∑
r∈N
w(r)
2r+1B2
F (r)(x1, . . . ,xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C(x1,...,xn)
, (12)
where C(x1, . . . ,xn)≥ 0 must be a real number, because, using a similar argument as before
C(x1, . . . ,xn) = ∑
r∈N
w(r)
2r+1B2
F(r)(x1, . . . ,xn)≤ L ∑
r∈N
w(r)F(r)(x1, . . . ,xn)≤ L
(3
2
)n
for some real L> 0. Therefore indeed, using the non-negative homogeneity of lower expectations:
Eγ(x1,...,xn)(−∆T γf (x1, . . . ,xn)) = Eγ(x1,...,xn)(C(x1, . . . ,xn)∆Mγf (x1, . . . ,xn))
=C(x1, . . . ,xn)Eγ(x1,...,xn)(∆M
γ
f (x1, . . . ,xn))≥ 0,
because Mγf is a submartingale; see Equation (7).
Since we now know that T γf is a supermartingale that is furthermore bounded below (by 0) it
follows from our supermartingale convergence theorem (De Cooman et al., 2016) that there is some
test supermartingale that converges to+∞ on all paths where T γf does not converge to a real number,
and therefore in particular on all paths in D∩A. Hence D∩A is indeed strictly null.
Lemma 30 Consider any real B> 0 and 0< ξ < 1B . Let M be any submartingale such that |∆M| ≤
B. Let S be any real process that only assumes values in {0,1}. Then the process FM defined by:
FM(x1, . . . ,xn) :=
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)
]
for all n ∈ N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n (13)
is a positive supermartingale with FM() = 1, and therefore in particular a test supermartingale.
Moreover, for ξ := ε
2B2 , with 0< ε < B, we have that
JMγf KS(x1, . . . ,xn)≤−ε ⇒ FM(x1, . . . ,xn)≥ exp
(
ε2
4B2
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk)
)
for all n ∈ N0 and (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n.
Finally, if ξ and M are computable, and S is computable, then FM is computable as well.
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Proof of Lemma 30 FM() = 1 trivially. To prove that FM is positive, consider any n ∈ N
and any (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0,1}n. Since it follows from 0 < ξB < 1, |∆M| ≤ B and S ∈ {0,1} that
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)≥ 1−ξB> 0 for all 0≤ k ≤ n−1, we see that indeed:
FM(x1, . . . ,xn) =
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)
]
> 0.
This also tells us that if we let
DM(s) := 1−ξS(s)∆M(s)> 0, (14)
then DM is a multiplier process, and FM = D
⊚
M. Moreover, since ξ > 0 and S(s) ∈ {0,1}, we infer
from the coherence and conjugacy properties of lower and upper expectations that
Eγ(s)(DM) = Eγ(s)
(
1−ξ (s)S(s)∆M(s))
= 1+Eγ(s)
(−ξ (s)S(s)∆M(s)) = 1−ξ (s)S(s)Eγ(s)(∆M(s))≤ 1,
where the inequality follows from Eγ(s)(∆M(s)) ≥ 0, because we assumed that M is a submartin-
gale. This shows that DM is a supermartingale multiplier, and therefore FM = D
⊚
M is indeed a test
supermartingale.
For the second statement, consider any 0 < ε < B and let ξ := ε
2B2 . Then for any n ∈ N0 and
x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}n such that JMγf KS(x1, . . . ,xn)≤−ε , we have for all real K:
FM(x1, . . . ,xn)≥ exp(K)⇔
n−1
∏
k=0
[
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)
]≥ exp(K)
⇔
n−1
∑
k=0
ln
[
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)
]≥ K. (15)
Since |∆M| ≤ B, S ∈ {0,1} and 0< ε < B, we find that
−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)≥−ξB=− ε
2B
>−1
2
for 0≤ k ≤ n−1.
As ln(1+ x)≥ x− x2 for x>− 1
2
, this allows us to infer that
n−1
∑
k=0
ln
[
1−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)
]
≥
n−1
∑
k=0
[−ξS(x1, . . . ,xk)∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1)−ξ 2S(x1, . . . ,xk)2(∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1))2]
=−ξ
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk)JM
γ
f KS(x1, . . . ,xn)−ξ 2
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk)(∆M(x1, . . . ,xk)(xk+1))
2
≥ ξ
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk)ε −ξ 2
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk)B
2
= ξ (ε−ξB2)
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk) =
ε2
4B2
n−1
∑
k=0
S(x1, . . . ,xk),
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where the first equality holds because S2 = S. Now choose K := ε
2
4B2 ∑
n−1
k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk) in Equa-
tion (15).
We now prove the last statement, dealing with the computability of FM.
Since M is assumed to be computable, so is ∆M, by Proposition 22. Since also ξ and S are as-
sumed to be computable, we infer from Equation (14) that the multiplier process DM is computable
too. If we now invoke Proposition 24, we find that FM = D
⊚
M is therefore computable as well.
Proof of Theorem 8 Assume ex absurdo that the inequality is not satisfied. Then we infer from
the proof of Theorem 29 that there is some positive test supermartingale T γf = ∑r∈Nw
(r)F(r) that is
unbounded above on ω : see Equation (11) there. We will now go back to the details of that proof
to show that we can make sure that T γf = D
⊚ for some computable multiplier process D, thereby
contradicting the assumed computable randomness for γ .
First of all, recall that for any r ∈N, the test supermartingale F(r) is the test supermartingale FM
constructed in Lemma 30, for the particular choicesM=Mγf , B=max{1,‖ f‖v} and ξ = ξr = 12r+1B2 .
Since the gamble f is assumed to be computable, so is the real number ‖ f‖v = | f (1)− f (0)|, and
therefore also the real numbers B and ξr. We infer from Proposition 28 that the submartingale M
γ
f is
computable, because the forecasting system γ and the gamble f are. Since in addition S is assumed
to be computable, we infer from Lemma 30 that the test supermartingale F(r) is computable.
We now consider the version of the test supermartingale T γf =∑r∈Nw
(r)F(r) corresponding to the
particular choices w(r) := 2−r, and prove that T γf is computable. To this effect, we use Proposition 17.
Indeed, consider, for each s= (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Ω♦ and n ∈N0, the real number
xs,n :=
n
∑
r=1
2−rF(r)(s),
which is computable because all real processes F (r) are. Since 0≤ F (r)(s)≤ (3
2
)m
, we get
|T γf (s)− xs,n|=
+∞
∑
r=n+1
2−rF(r)(s)≤
(3
2
)m +∞
∑
r=n+1
2−r =
(3
2
)m
2−n.
If we now let e(s,N) := N+m, then since
N+m≥ N+m log2
3
2
,
we see that n≥ e(s,N) implies |T γf (s)−xs,n| ≤ 2−N for all s ∈Ω♦ and n,N ∈N0. Since the function
e is clearly computable, we may use Proposition 17 to conclude that T γf is indeed computable.
Now let D be the unique supermartingale multiplier such that T γf = D
⊚ [the uniqueness follows
from the fact that T γf is positive]. Since T
γ
f is computable, it then follows from Proposition 25 that
D is computable as well.
A.5 Proofs and additional material for Section 7
Proof of Proposition 9 Immediate consequence of Proposition 4, with γ [0,1] = γv ∈ ΓC(ω).
Proof of Proposition 10 This follows from Proposition 5, because I ⊆ J implies γ I ⊆ γJ .
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Proof of Corollary 11 First, assume that I is computable. It follows from Proposition 20 that γ I
is computable as well. Furthermore, if we let I{1}(x) := x for all x ∈ {0,1}, then I{1} and −I{1} are
clearly computable gambles on {0,1}. The first and last inequality now follow from Theorem 8,
by choosing f = I{1} and f = −I{1}, respectively, since EI(I{1}) = p and EI(−I{1}) = −p. The
second inequality is a standard property of limits inferior and superior.
If I is not computable, then for any ε > 0, since all rational numbers are computable, there is
some computable J = [q,q] ∈ C such that p− ε ≤ q≤ p ≤ p ≤ q≤ p+ ε . Since I ⊆ J, it follows
from Proposition 10 that also J ∈ CC(ω). Since, moreover, J is computable, it follows from the first
part of the proof that
p− ε ≤ q≤ liminf
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
≤ limsup
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S(x1, . . . ,xk)
≤ q≤ p+ ε .
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12 For the first statement, let I = [p, p] and J = [q,q] and assume ex ab-
surdo that I ∩ J = /0. We may assume without loss of generality that p > q. It then follows from
Corollary 11, with S(s) := 1 for all s ∈ Ω♦, that
liminf
n→+∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
xk ≤ limsup
n→+∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
xk ≤ q< p≤ liminf
n→+∞
1
n
n
∑
k=1
xk,
a contradiction.
For the second statement, let K := I∩J. We will prove that K ∈CC(ω). Again, let I = [p, p] and
J= [q,q]. Because of symmetry, we may assume without loss of generality that q ≤ p. Furthermore,
due to the first statement, we know that then p≤ q. If we have that I⊆ J, then I= I∩J and therefore,
since I ∈ CC(ω), the result holds trivially. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that
q < p ≤ q < p, which implies that K = I∩ J = [p,q].
Consider any computable test supermartingale T in T
γK
C , then we must show that T remains
bounded on ω . We may assume without loss of generality that there is some computable super-
martingale multiplier D for γK such that T = D⊚.
Now let DI be the map from situations to gambles on {0,1}, defined by
DI(s)(z) :=
{
min{D(s)(1),1} if z= 1
max{D(s)(0),1} if z= 0 for all s ∈ Ω
♦ and z ∈ {0,1}.
ThenDI is a supermartingale multiplier for γ I : that it is non-negative follows from the non-negativity
of D; moreover, for any s ∈ Ω♦, we have that EI(DI(s)) ≤ 1. Indeed, to prove the this, we con-
sider two cases: D(s)(0) ≤ 1 and D(s)(0) > 1. If D(s)(0) ≤ 1, then DI(s) ≤ 1 and therefore
also E I(DI(s)) ≤ 1, by C1. The case that D(s)(0) > 1 is a bit more involved. For a start, since
D(s)(0) > 1 implies that DI(s)(1) < DI(s)(0), we find that
EI(DI(s)) = Ep(DI(s)) = EK(DI(s)).
Furthermore, since by assumption EK(D(s))≤ 1,D(s)(0)> 1 implies thatD(s)(1)≤ 1, again by C1.
We therefore find that D(s) = DI(s). By combining these two findings, it follows that indeed here
also
EI(DI(s)) = EK(DI(s)) = EK(D(s))≤ 1.
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SinceDI is indeed a supermartingale multiplier for γ I , we find that TI :=D
⊚
I is a test supermartingale
for γ I .
Furthermore, since D is computable, so is DI , because taking minima and maxima preserves
computability. Hence, TI belongs to T
γ I
C . Therefore, and because I ∈ CC(ω), it follows that TI(ωn)
remains bounded as n→+∞.
Also, if we let DJ be a map from situations to gambles on {0,1}, defined by
DJ(s)(z) :=
{
max{D(s)(1),1} if z= 1
min{D(s)(0),1} if z= 0 for all s ∈ Ω
♦ and z ∈ {0,1},
and consider TJ := D
⊚
J , a similar course of reasoning leads us to conclude that TJ belongs to T
γJ
C .
Therefore, and because J ∈ CC(ω), it follows that TJ(ωn) remains bounded as n→+∞.
Next, we observe that D = DIDJ, and therefore also T = D⊚ = D
⊚
I D
⊚
J = TITJ. And since both
TI and TJ remain bounded on ω , so, therefore, does T .
Proof of Proposition 13 When ω is computable and has infinitely many zeroes and ones, there is
a computable selection process S1 that selects all the ones, with ∑
n−1
k=0 S1(x1, . . . ,xk)→+∞, and an-
other computable selection process S0 = 1−S1 that selects all the zeroes, with ∑n−1k=0 S0(x1, . . . ,xk)→
+∞. For any I ∈ CC(ω), we then infer from Corollary 11 that
min I ≤ liminf
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S0(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S0(x1, . . . ,xk)
= 0,
and similarly
max I ≥ limsup
n→+∞
∑n−1k=0 S1(x1, . . . ,xk)xk+1
∑n−1k=0 S1(x1, . . . ,xk)
= 1,
so indeed I = [0,1].
A.6 Proofs and additional material for Section 8
Proof of Proposition 14 The converse implication follows at once from Proposition 5 and the
fact that for any I ∈ C such that [p,q]⊆ I, the stationary forecasting system γI is more conservative
than γp,q, in the sense that γp,q ⊆ γ I .
For the direct implication, assume that I ∈ CC(ω) and fix any ε > 0. Since all rational numbers
are computable, there are computable intervals [p, p] ∈ C and [q,q] ∈ C such that
p ∈ [p, p]⊆ [p− ε , p+ ε ] and q ∈ [q,q]⊆ [q− ε ,q+ ε ].
Consider now the forecasting system γε , defined by
γε(z1, . . . ,zn) :=
{
[p, p] if n is odd
[q,q] if n is even
for all (z1, . . . ,zn) ∈Ω♦.
Then γε is clearly computable and, since γp,q⊆ γε , we know from Proposition 5 that ω is computably
random for γε . Therefore, we find that
min I ≤ liminf
n→+∞
∑nk=1 x2k
n
≤ limsup
n→+∞
∑nk=1 x2k
n
≤ p≤ p+ ε
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where the first and third inequality follow from Corollary 11 and Theorem 8, respectively, for ap-
propriately chosen computable selection processes. Similarly, we also find that
max I ≥ limsup
n→+∞
∑nk=1 x2k−1
n
≥ liminf
n→+∞
∑nk=1 x2k−1
n
≥ q≥ q− ε .
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, this allows us to conclude that min I ≤ p and max I ≥ q, and, therefore, that
[p,q] ⊆ I.
That δn ↓ 0 follows readily by combining Equations (16) and (17) below. Also observe, for all
n ∈N, that
pn(1− pn) =
(1
2
−δn
)(1
2
+δn
)
=
1
4
−δ 2n (16)
=
1
4
− e− 2n+1 (e 1n+1 −1)= 1
4
− e− 1n+1 + e− 2n+1 =
(
e−
1
n+1 − 1
2
)2
, (17)
and therefore, since e−
1
n+1 > 1
2
, that
e
1
2(n+1)
1√
2
(√
pn+
√
1− pn
)
= e
1
2(n+1)
√
1
2
+
√
pn(1− pn) = e
1
2(n+1)
√
e−
1
n+1 = 1. (18)
Proof of Proposition 15 We first show that {1/2} /∈ CC(ω), so the sequence is not computably
random. Consider the multiplier processes D1/2 and D∼1/2, defined for all n ∈N and (z1, . . . ,zn−1) ∈
Ω♦ by
D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1) := e
1
2(n+1)
√
2p̂n and D∼1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1) := e
1
2(n+1)
1√
2p̂n
,
where we define, for any p ∈ [0,1], the corresponding mass function p̂ by letting p̂(1) := p and
p̂(0) := 1− p. We then find that
ln
(
D⊚1/2(x1, . . . ,xn)D
⊚
∼1/2(x1, . . . ,xn)
)
=
n
∑
k=1
1
k+1
→+∞ as n→+∞. (19)
Furthermore, taking into account Equation (18), it is then easy to verify that for all n ∈ N and
(z1, . . . ,zn−1) ∈ Ω♦:
E1/2
(
D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
=
1
2
e
1
2(n+1)
√
2pn+
1
2
e
1
2(n+1)
√
2(1− pn) = 1
and
Epn
(
D∼1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
= pne
1
2(n+1)
1√
2pn
+(1− pn)e
1
2(n+1)
1√
2(1− pn)
= 1.
Hence, we find that D1/2 is a supermartingale multiplier for the stationary forecasting system γ{1/2}
and that D∼1/2 is a supermartingale multiplier for the forecasting system γ∼1/2. Both of these su-
permartingale multipliers are furthermore clearly computable. Since D∼1/2 is a computable super-
martingale multiplier for the forecasting system γ∼1/2, it follows by assumption that D⊚∼1/2(x1, . . . ,xn)
remains bounded as n → +∞. Therefore, and taking into account Equation (19), we find that
D⊚1/2(x1, . . . ,xn)→ +∞ as n→ +∞. Since D1/2 is a computable supermartingale multiplier for the
stationary forecasting system γ{1/2}, this implies that indeed {1/2} /∈ CC(ω).
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In a similar way, for all ε > 0, it can also be shown that [1/2−ε ,1/2] /∈ CC(ω) and [1/2,1/2+ε ] /∈
CC(ω). We sketch the proof for [1/2− ε ,1/2] /∈ CC(ω). The proof for [1/2,1/2+ ε ] /∈ CC(ω) is
completely analogous. Let the multiplier process D1/2,− be defined for all n ∈N and (z1, . . . ,zn−1) ∈
Ω♦ by
D1/2,−(z1, . . . ,zn−1) :=
{
D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1) for n even
1 for n odd,
and similarly for D∼1/2,−. Then
ln
(
D⊚1/2,−(x1, . . . ,xn)D
⊚
∼1/2,−(x1, . . . ,xn)
)
=
⌊n/2⌋
∑
k=1
1
2k+1
→+∞ as n→+∞.
If we now fix any n ∈ N and (z1, . . . ,zn−1) ∈Ω♦, then
E [1/2−ε ,1/2]
(
D1/2,−(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
=
{
E1/2
(
D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
= 1 for n even
E1/2(1) = 1 for n odd,
because for even n, it follows from p̂n(1) = pn > 1− pn = p̂n(0) that also D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)(1) >
D1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)(0). Similarly,
Epn
(
D∼1/2,−(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
=
{
Epn
(
D∼1/2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)
= 1 for n even
Epn(1) = 1 for n odd.
This tells us thatD1/2,− is a supermartingale multiplier for the stationary forecasting system γ [1/2−ε ,1/2],
and that D∼1/2,− is a supermartingale multiplier for the forecasting system γ∼1/2. Since D1/2,− and
D∼1/2,− are clearly computable, the rest of the proof is now similar to that of {1/2} /∈ CC(ω).
Finally, we show that for any ε1,ε2 ∈ (0,1/2], Iε1,ε2 := [1/2− ε1,1/2+ ε2] ∈ CC(ω). Assume ex
absurdo that Iε1,ε2 /∈ CC(ω) for some ε1,ε2 ∈ (0,1/2], meaning that there is some computable super-
martingale multiplier Dε1,ε2 for the stationary forecasting system Iε1,ε2 such that D
⊚
ε1,ε2 is unbounded
on ω = (x1, . . . ,xn, . . . ). Consider any rational number α such that 0<α ≤min{ε1,ε2} and let nα be
the smallest natural number n∈N such that δn≤ α and therefore pn ∈ Iε1,ε2 , or, using Equations (16)
and (17), let
nα =
⌈
− 1
ln 1+
√
1−4α2
2
−1
⌉
.
Then since α is rational and therefore computable, nα is computable as well. We now consider a
new multiplier process D, defined by
D(z1, . . . ,zn−1) :=
{
1 if n< nα
Dε1,ε2(z1, . . . ,zn−1) if n≥ nα
for all n ∈ N and (z1 . . . ,zn−1) ∈Ω♦.
Since Dε1,ε2 is computable and nα is computable, D is clearly computable. Furthermore, since
pn ∈ Iε1,ε2 for n≥ nα , we find for all n ∈ N and (z1 . . . ,zn−1) ∈ Ω♦ that
Epn
(
D(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)≤{Epn(1) = 1 if n< nα
EIε1,ε2
(
Dε1,ε2(z1, . . . ,zn−1)
)≤ 1 if n≥ nα ,
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which implies that D is a computable supermartingale multiplier for the forecasting system γ∼1/2.
By construction, D⊚ is unbounded on ω , simply because D⊚ε1,ε2 is unbounded on ω . This contradicts
the fact that ω is computably random for γ∼1/2.
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